Utah v. Farhad Soroushirn : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1977
Utah v. Farhad Soroushirn : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert B. Hansen; Attorney General; Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent.
William D. Marsh; Attorney for Defendant-Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Soroushirn, No. 14421.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1977).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/414
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
45.9 
.S9 
DOCKET NO 
UTA 
.JMJL 
•-•
:
 SUPREME 
BRIEF 
2t4 
COURiT 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-
Respondent, i 
vs. 
FARHAD SOROUSHIRN, 
Defendant-
Appellant. 
Case No. 11510 
BRIEF O l APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMWT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FfR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF 
UTAH, THE HONORABLE ROpALD O. HYDE, JUDGE, PRESIDING. 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
WILLIAM D. MARSH 
Suite 1, The Estate House 
2408 Van Buren Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
F I L E D 
AUH 2 " 1977 
Cierka Supreme Courts Utah 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
vs. 
FARHAD SOROUSHIRN, 
Defendant-
Appellant. 
Case No. 11540 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF 
UTAH, THE HONORABLE RONALD O. HYDE, JUDGE, PRESIDING. 
WILLIAM D. MARSH 
Suite 1, The Estate House 
2408 Van Buren Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 1 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY 
ADMITTING EXTRA JUDICIAL STATEMENTS 
OFFERRED IN VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT'S 
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION 4 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
REFUSING TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OBTAINED 
AS A RESULT OF AN UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND 
SEIZURE 8 
CONCLUSION 9 
CASES CITED 
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 415, 85 S. 
Ct. 1074, 13 L. Ed. 2d 934 (1965) 7 
Johnson v. Zerbs t , 304 U. S. 458, 58 S. 
a . 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938) 7 
Map v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 
6 L Ed. 2d 1081, 81 S. Ct. 1684 9 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 16 
L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966) 5 
State v. Dunkley, 85 Utah 546, 39 
P . 2d 1097 5 
STATUTES CITED 
Section 58-37-8 (2) (a) (i), Utah Code Annotated (1953) 1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
vs. 
FARHAD SOROUSHIRN, 
Defendant-
Appellant. 
Case No, 11540 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Appellant was charged with Possession of a Controlled Substance to 
wit: Marijuana and convicted by a jury, the Honorable Ronald O. Hyde presiding. 
Prom the conviction,he appeals. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Appellant was charged by complaint with the misdemeanor of Possession 
of a Controlled Substance in violation of Section 58-37-8(2) (a) (i), Utah Code 
Annotated (1953) as amended. The case was tried to a jury with the Honorable 
Ronald O. Hyde, Judge, Second Judicial District for Weber County, presiding. 
The Appellant was found guilty of Possession of a Controlled Substance and fined 
$100. 00. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant seeks reversal of the conviction and/or a new trial . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the early morning hours of July 3, 1977, Mr. Djafar Tawakoli, a Persian 
student at Weber State College, made preparation to terminate his tenancy of room 
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119, Warren Apartments, in Ogden City, Utah. He took his friend, defendant 
Farhad Soroushirn, to the manager's officer to introduce him and to tell the 
manager that Mr. Soroushirn would come by later to pick up his belongings and 
turn in Mr. Tawakoli's key to the apartment. The office was closed, (Tr 99) 
Without further delay Mr. Soroushirn, together with Hatsan Rafetti, 
transported Mr. Tawakoli to the Salt Lake City Airport. Prior to boarding his 
10:30 a.m. flight to Persia, Mr. Tawakoli gave Mr. Soroushirn the key to his 
apartment and asked him to remove his belongings from room 119 and to put 
the same into storage until his return. (Tr 98) 
Sometime after 9:00 a.m. on the same morning, a cleaning lady, thinking 
the apartment was empty, and by means of a master key (Tr 38) entered Mr. 
Tawakoli1 s room at the Warren Apartments. She observed that the room had not 
been vacated and that a TV set, luggage, and other personal effects remained. 
(Tr 33) The matter was referred to the apartment managers who later on in the 
day decided to make an "inventory" of what items were in the apartment. (Tr 34) 
The cleaning lady and one of the managers returned to the apartment and 
began an inventory of all items in the apartment. While searching the apartment, 
they encountered a small plastic baggie in a cupboard drawer. (Tr 40) Becoming 
suspicious of its contents, they called two police officers, living in room 128 of 
the apartments, for advice. (Tr 36) 
Ogden City Police Officer Joseph William OfKeefe J r . and Ogden Reserve 
Officer James Robert McKinley responded to their call. (Tr 42, 43) Officer 
O'Keefe opened the baggie and decided it was marijuana. The officer and the 
apartment manager proceeded to search the boxes and personal effects remaining 
in the apartment. (Tr 44) In a small box in another closet, they located a second 
plastic baggie containing what they believed to be marijuana. (Tr 45) 
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Officer OfKeefe returned to his apartment to call the "Narcotics Squad". 
(Tr 45) Officer McKinley was left in charge of the apartment. After waiting 
about five minutes, he placed the two baggies on the counter, locked the door to 
the apartment, and drove his wife to her mother fs house. (Tr 66, 67) 
After Mr. Tawakolifs departure for Persia, Messrs. Soroushirn and 
Rafetti visited a friend in Salt Lake City for several hours. At about 3:30 p .m. 
they returned to Ogden and proceeded to Mr. Tawakolifs apartment to gather his 
belongings and put them into storage as per his request. (Tr 116) Using the key 
provided them and being unaware of any of the prior happenings in the apartment, 
they began removing boxes and suitcases from the apartment and placing them in 
Mr. RafettiTs automobile. 
They were observed by Officer 0?Keefe and by one of the apartment managers. 
Officer 0TKeefe re-entered the apartment and demanded an explanation as to what 
each was doing there. Mr. Soroushirn and Mr. Rafetti each explained their mission. 
(Tr46, 47) 
When the manager returned to the apartment, he exclaimed "the stuff1 s 
gone11. Officer 0TKeefe then demanded Mr. Soroushirn and/or Mr. Rafetti tell 
him "what happened to the marijuana". When each indicated he had no idea what 
the officer was talking about, he identified himself by showing his "police identi-
fication" and gave them a "Miranda warning". (Tr 48) •' 
Officer OfKeefe then had Mr. Soroushirn and Mr. Rafetti go to Mr. RafettiTs 
vehicle and remove all of the items Mr. Rafetti had placed in the vehicle and 
return them to the apartment. (Tr 50) Defendant was advised by Officer 0TKeefe 
that he had been in the apartment fifteen minutes earlier and that when he left, 
there was marijuana in the room and that defendant was a suspect in "an official 
police investigation". (Tr 59) 
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At some unspecified point, Reserve Officer McKinley returned to the 
apartment and a search of the apartment was made. Officer McKinley, after 
searching one of the boxes in the apartment exclaimed "I found it" and brandished 
two small plastic bags which he claimed to have removed from a tape recorder in 
the box. (Tr 61, 68) 
McKinley, in street clothes and without identifying himself as an officer, 
demanded that defendants explain to him what happened. When Mr. Soroushirn 
declined to talk to him, McKinley made a "citizen's a r res t" and Mr. Soroushirn 
was taken into custody. (Tr 78, 79) 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING EXTRA JUDICIAL STATE-
MENTS OFFERRED IN VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT'S PRIVILEGE 
AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION 
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress all oral statements, admissions, 
or confessions obtained in violation of his rights as enumerated under the V and 
XIV Amendments of the Constitution of the United States and Article 1, Section 12 
of the Utah State Constitution. (R 18) The motion was heard and denied prior to 
tr ial . (Tr 4-16) 
Officer McKinley sought to interrogate Mr, Soroushirn while at the Tawakoli 
apartment. He consealed his identity as a Reserve Officer and State Liquor and 
Narcotics agent. (Tr 65) He identified himself only as a janitor-maintenance man 
for the Warren house. (Tr 77) After Officer O'Keefe had reportedly given a 
"Miranda Warning", Officer McKinley demanded of defendant "Well, do you want 
to explain to me what happened". When Mr. Soroushirn replied tfno, I don't want 
to talk to you", Officer McKinley turned to Officer Soukai and in defendant's presence 
stated, "I would like to sign a complaint against him. Then we will find out the 
truth". (Tr 9-10) He again asked defendant if he wanted to talk to him. Again Mr. 
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Soroushirn declined. Officer McKinley then made a "citizen's arrest f r and had 
Mr. Soroushirn transported to jail still believing he was arrested by a janitor. (Tr 79) 
After posting bail Mr. Soroushirn returned to the Warren Apartments 
to retrieve his friendTs belongings. He encountered Officer McKinley. Still 
believing the officer to be a janitor, he inquired, "Why did you do this to me 
Mr >ther?" Officer McKinley, still bent on concealing his identity, coyly replied, 
"Well, if you had been truthful with me, it may not have gotten this far". (Tr 72) 
The officer then launched into a full scale interrogation of the defendant with-
out benefit of Miranda Warning or notice of his police identity. (Tr 77) As a 
result of this interrogation, the officer was allowed to tell the jury that Mr. 
Soroushirn (1) admitted owning the tape recorder in which the marijuana was found, 
(2) denied owning the marijuana and (3) admitted putting the marijuana in the tape 
recorder. (Tr 74) 
Officer McKinleyfs action seems calculated to coerce, confuse, deceive 
and trick Mr. Soroushirn into making an incriminating statement. Mr. Soroushirn 
interpreted the officer as saying he was being prosecuted because he "told a lie". 
(Tr 119) 
Before any statements are admissable, the state has the burden of proving 
they were voluntarily given. State v. Dunkley, 85 Utah 546, 39 P. 2d 1097. The 
United States Supreme Court has stated "moreover, any evidence that the accused 
was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will of course, show that the 
defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege". Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 
436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966). 
Officer McKinley!s own testimony discloses (1) that he twice threatened to sign 
a criminal complaint if defendant didnTt tell him what happened, (2) made a "citizen's 
arrest" of defendant after defendant's second refusal to discuss the matter, (3) 
concealed his identity as a police officer, (4) misrepresented his interest in the 
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case as that of a janitor, (5) implied that if defendant talked with him that charges 
might not go any farther, (6) continued to press defendant for damaging information 
after having been told twice before that the defendant did not desire to discuss 
anything with him, (7) fastidiously avoided giving defendant any Miranda type 
warnings during either interrogation under the assumption "that he , . .wasn ' t 
obligated to, not as a citizen". (Tr 77) 
McKinleyTs assertion that he need not be concerned with Miranda Warnings 
because he was acting as a "citizen" exposes the contempt the prosecution displayed 
for defendants right against self incrimination. McKinley, in addition to being 
a Reserve Ogden Police Officer, was a State Liquor and Narcotics under cover 
agent. (Tr 65) He controlled the investigation and prosecution of the case from 
the outset in that (1) he made the initial search of the apartment, (2) discovered the 
second bag of marijuana, (3) took charge of the apartment while waiting for the 
"narcotics squad", (4) conducted a second search of the apartment and its contents, 
(5) located what was believed to be the missing marijuana inside defendants tape 
recorder, (6) sought to interrogate Mr. Soroushirn and (7) arrested the defendant. 
Since when does one!s constitutional rights depend on whether or not an investigating 
officer claims to be acting "under cover" and as a "citizen"? 
The unreliability of Officer McKinley1 s translation of the statements attributed 
to Mr. Soroushirn should have been enough in and of itself to exclude the statements. 
Mr. Soroushirn admittedly spoke very broken English at the time of his interrogation. 
(Tr 6) He took the stand and denied making the statement as attributed to him by 
the officer, (Tr 119, 120) Officer McKinley made no reports of his investigation 
or of the defendants statements. The statements were never reduced to writing, 
and the officer made no notes of his conversation. He was unable to state exactly 
what was said. (Tr 87, 88) 
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The prosecution argued that Mr. Soroushirn initiated the conversation, 
t iplained of and that the damaging admissions were made after his release 
from custody, and therefore his statements were not protected by Miranda. It 
should be noted that the U. S. Supreme Court in Miranda, Supra stated: 
"The prosecution may not use s tatements , . . stemming from custodial 
interrogation unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safe guards 
to secure the privilege against self incrimination", at 444 [emphasis 
added] 
It can be fairly inferred from the record that the statement complained of 
ffstemmedn directly from the earlier custodial interrogation and the threats and 
misrepresentations attended thereto. There is little doubt that Officer McKinley 
sought to circumvent the Miranda Warnings by deliberately directing and designing 
his questioning to uncover damaging evidence against defendant in the forthcoming trial, 
Furthermore all was done after the defendant had twice told him he did not wish 
to discuss the incident with him and after the officer had misrepresented his 
interest in the case and had given no Miranda Warning. 
The U. S. Supreme Court has stated that courts should indulge every reasonabL 
presumption against a waiver of any fundamental constitutional right rather than 
presume acquiescence in the loss. Johnson v. Zerbs t , 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 
1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938) at page 1466. Even in a state court proceeding, the 
effective waiver of a federal right is governed by Federal Standards. Douglas v. 
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S. Ct. 1074, 13 L. Ed. 2d 934 (1965). In summary, 
it is submitted that the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of Officer 
McKinley to be placed before the jury. The state offerred no substantial evidence 
as to the voluntariness of the statements attributed to defendant. On the other 
hand, the record is frought with examples of coersion, misrepresentation and 
trickery. The fact that there was no written record of these statements and that 
. _ „7~ . 
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the officer testified from memory as to what he thought he heard a Persian speaking 
broken English say several months earlier, raises further questions. The defendant's 
denial of the statements when added to the already complicated factual situation 
gives compelling proof that the statements should have been suppressed. 
* » 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF AN UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress any items of evidence taken from 
defendants possession at room 119, Warren Apartments on the grounds that the same 
were seized in violation of his constitutional rights under the IV and XIV Amendments 
of the U. S. Constitution and Article 1 Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah. The motion was denied. (Tr 16) 
Officers OfKeefe and'McKinley preformed several searches. All were made 
without warrants. The first search of the apartment was made at the request of the 
apartment management with the apparent belief the apartment was vacant. It is not 
this search wherewith the appellant takes issue. 
After the first search was completed, the officers locked the apartment and 
vacated the premises. When they later returned, the apartment was occupied by 
Messrs. Soroushirn and Rafetti. Possessory rights to the apartment had been 
transferred to them by Mr. Tawakoli for the purpose of removing his belongings 
and putting them into storage. The officers were fully advised. (Tr 46) 
Despite this, Officer OfKeefe entered the apartment, ordered the return 
of all boxes previously taken from the apartment and placed in the automobile and 
proceeded to search all items of personalty in defendant's possession and/or under 
his control. Officer McKinley searched defendant's tape recorder and after 
removing its eovar discovered the contraband in question. (Tr 68) 
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It is acknowledged that perhaps the apartment manager could and did 
consent to the earlier search of the apartment. However, the search of the items 
of personalty under the defendants control both in the apartment and in the auto-
mobile, is a different matter. The apartment management had no claim over these 
items and no right to consent to the search. Furthermore, the officers never 
requested or received the consent of Messrs. Soroushirn or Rafetti to make any 
additional searches. Accordingly, the search of the tape recorder and the seizure 
of its contents without a warrant and/or defendants consent was in violation of his 
constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures and defendant's 
motion to suppress these items from evidence should have been granted. Map v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 6 L Ed. 2d 1081, 81 S. Ct. 1684. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in refusing to suppress the extrajudicial statements 
given by the accused in violation of Constitutional rights against self incrimination 
and in refusing to suppress evidence obtained as a result of warrantless search of 
the accused's belongings. 
Respectively Submitted 
William D. Marsh 
Counsel for Defendant-Appellant 
Suite 1, The Estate House 
2408 Van Buren Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
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